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1571 
LOOKING THROUGH THE WRONG END OF THE 
TELESCOPE: THE JAPANESE JUDICIAL 
RESPONSE TO STEEL PARTNERS,  
MURAKAMI, AND HORIE 
STEPHEN GIVENS

 
OVERVIEW: POISON PILL DOCTRINE IN SEARCH OF A PHILOSOPHY 
When the Bulldog Sauce case
1
 landed at the doorstep of the Japanese 
Supreme Court in July 2007, one suspects that the Court greeted it with all 
the enthusiasm of a homeowner who opens the front door to collect the 
morning paper, only to find waiting a basket full of orphaned kittens.  
Unusually for a Japanese Supreme Court case, the Bulldog Sauce case 
attracted intense public scrutiny as an emblem of the struggle between a 
controversial new breed of corporate raider and the Japanese corporate 
establishment. But beyond that, in ways too subtle for headline news, the 
two lower courts arrived at the same destination through two entirely 
different paths of judicial reasoning, each of which presented its own set 
of awkward problems. The issues and the posture of the case were such 
that the Supreme Court could not easily resolve the split between the 
lower courts simply by endorsing one line of reasoning and rejecting the 
other. 
How the Supreme Court resolved the Bulldog Sauce case, and the 
Japanese judicial response to the new breed of raider generally, reveals a 
great deal about the way the courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, 
think and function within the larger political and policy-making process. 
The inconsistent tangle of doctrines thrown up by the lower courts in the 
Bulldog Sauce case was the culmination of over two years of judicial 
efforts to accommodate defensive techniques against the new breed of 
corporate raider. The Japanese courts absorbed the consensus that 
something had to be done about the raiders and actively cooperated, 
judicially revising existing law and doctrine so as to overcome obstacles 
standing in the way of defensive techniques—in particular, poison pill—
like stratagems. In doing so, however, they jumped straight from the 
premise that ―something had to be done‖ to tinkering with specific 
 
 
  Professor, Faculty of Law, Aoyama Gakuin University. 
 1. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 7, 2007, 1809 JUNKAN SHŌJI HŌMU [SHŌJI HŌMU] 16. 
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statutory provisions that stood in the way, without pausing to factor in the 
real-world commercial context of different varieties of defensive 
techniques or the larger policies served by the legal ―obstacles‖ they 
sought to overcome.  
Examing legal problems through the wrong end of the telescope is not 
a phenomenon confined to the Japanese judiciary. It is endemic to 
Japanese legal education itself, which, unlike American legal education, 
focuses on mastering discrete statutes and rules in isolation and as given, 
rather than thinking about whether the rules make sense. It is reflected in a 
national landscape of rules mysteriously divided into a minefield of petty 
rules and regulations unimaginatively administered by officialdom, on the 
one hand, and another class of rules—such as those governing gambling, 
prostitution, and other underworld activities—that are conveniently 
ignored or evaded by painfully artificial fictions, on the other. The same 
root mentality is reflected in Japanese legal scholarship generally, which 
typically consists of low-to-the-ground summaries of existing law and 
scholarship without a transcending thesis. To take another field, Japanese 
politics in general are non-ideological and unprincipled, more defined by 
faction and relationships than principle or ideology. Socratic debate, 
principled argument and dissent, and elegant intellectual distinctions—this 
is not how Japan expresses itself.  
As the judges in the Bulldog Sauce case experienced, interpreting and 
applying law low to the ground, case by case, without a broader policy 
perspective, is like cutting someone’s hair up close without stepping back 
to survey the results. You cut the hair too short here, and too long there, 
and have to keep circling back to correct earlier miscuttings. The doctrinal 
twists and turns the law of poison pills has taken are largely attributable to 
the failure of Japanese courts to step back and address the issues more 
honestly and from a wider perspective.  
The courts confronting defensive techniques thrown up to thwart the 
raiders viewed the problem as a narrow one, pegged to two specific 
provisions of the Company Law: (1) Article 247 of the Company Law,
2
 
which, as interpreted by a long and consistent line of precedent, prohibited 
management from issuing stock or stock rights to try to influence a control 
contest, and (2) Article 109 of the Company Law,
3
 which codifies the 
 
 
 2. Article 247 of the Company Law provides that shareholders may demand that the issuance of 
rights to subscribe for new shares be suspended ―when the issuance of the said rights to subscribe for 
new shares is to be conducted in a materially unfair manner.‖ Kaisha-hō [Company Law], Law No. 86 
of 2005, art. 247. 
 3. Article 109 of the Company Law provides that ―[a] kabushiki kaisha (corporation) shall treat 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/9
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long-standing case law principle that shareholders of the same class be 
treated on a nondiscriminatory basis. Poison pills and related defensive 
techniques that involve the issuance of stock or warrants on a 
discriminatory basis—as between the unwanted bidder and the remaining 
shareholders—bring directly into play both of these statutory provisions, 
as well as the policies which presumably lie behind them. 
From the beginning, the Japanese courts focused narrowly on Article 
109 and Article 247, each viewed as a separate and discrete problem, and 
sought to fashion new doctrines built around the statutory provisions that 
would accommodate what they understood to be the ―Japanese poison 
pill.‖ The issue was defined at the threshold as one involving the legality 
of a ―discriminatory issuance of warrants.‖ So framed, the courts could see 
no relevant distinction between a typical poison pill, designed to give 
management leverage to negotiate better terms with a bidder, and the 
Bulldog Sauce warrants, which had the entirely different effect of forcing 
Steel Partners to cash out shares it already owned and expelling it as a 
shareholder. Since both took the form of a ―discriminatory issuance of 
warrants,‖ they were treated as indistinguishable. Similarly, because the 
problems were analyzed through the narrow prism of discrete statutes, 
rather than broader policies, the courts had no answer to the legality of 
other defensive techniques that did not involve the issuance of stock rights 
or were not overtly ―discriminatory.‖ Lacking a philosophy or a policy 
framework to analyze defensive techniques in corporate control contests, 
the courts were like the blind men stroking the trunk, ears, and other 
appendages of the elephant. 
One might infer that the Supreme Court felt that the new (and 
inconsistent) corporate law doctrines declared by the two lower courts 
were not only extreme in a substantive corporate law sense, but that the 
herky-jerky judicial process that generated the doctrines was itself suspect. 
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, it was too late to 
unscramble and relitigate the issues. The Supreme Court accepted the 
categories it inherited from the lower courts, but manipulated the same 
abstract doctrines and verbal formulas in a way that essentially declawed 
the decision. Thanks to the Supreme Court’s deft surgery, as a corporate 
law decision, and in particular a guiding precedent on the Japanese poison 
pill, Bulldog Sauce ends not with a bang, but a whimper. If it has anything 
 
 
its shareholders equally in accordance with the particulars and number of shares held by them.‖ Id. at 
109. 
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to say, it is limited to the exceptional facts of the Bulldog Sauce case itself, 
which are unlikely to recur. 
The Bulldog Sauce case itself ended harmlessly, if not pointlessly, but 
as I will argue in the final section of this essay, the judicial mentality that 
drove its decision is not always harmless. Judicial accommodation of 
prevailing consensus is harmless so long as the consensus it reflects is 
benign. But, as the collective overreaction to the new breed of raiders 
shows, the shifting tides of consensus can take the form of a collective 
rush to judgment against which courts should serve as an autonomous 
check. The Japanese courts uncritically accepted the prevailing official 
consensus that the new breed of raider was a malignant influence. The 
courts were shamefully complicit with the national prosecutors in applying 
the criminal laws without a full comprehension of the relevant commercial 
context to convict Yoshiaki Murakami and Takafumi Horie, the highest-
profile domestic raiders, and put them out of business. In a criminal 
context, the courts applied rules mechanically without pausing to think or 
explain what was offensively criminal about what the defendants actually 
did or who had actually been harmed. 
A. Article 247: Misdigested Delaware Jurisprudence 
1. Legal Obstacle to the Poison Pill 
Article 247 of the Company Law authorizes injunctions against the 
issuance of stock warrants ―when the issuance of the warrants is to be 
conducted in a materially unfair manner.‖ 4  By its terms, Article 247 
applies to the issuance of stock rights and not other forms of transactions 
that could be used to impede a bid for control. A fairly consistent line of 
cases, as well as the accepted academic view, has held that the issuance of 
stock rights, the ―primary purpose‖ of which was to influence or impede a 
bid for control, was ―materially unfair‖ and therefore enjoinable.5 Article 
247 had been successfully invoked when management of target companies 
tried to block a change of control to an unwanted bidder by issuing share 
 
 
 4. Id. art. 247, para. 2. 
 5. See discussion of precedents in Y. Ota & S. Noda, Kigyo bashu boeisaku to shite no dai-san 
wariate zoshi to sono mondaiten [Issues Involved in the Use of Stock Issuance to Third Parties as a 
Takeover Defense], in TEKITAITEKI M&A TAIŌ NO SAISENTAN [Leading Edge Techniques in Hostile 
M&A] 169–75 (Y. Ota & R. Nakayama eds., 2005); KENJIRŌ EGASHIRA, KABUSHIKI KAISHA HŌ 
[CORPORATION LAW] 682–83 (2005), and academic articles cited therein. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/9
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rights to a friendly third party—the method Japanese companies have 
typically used to defend themselves against unsolicited bids.
6
  
The policy behind this case law, though not elaborately spelled out in 
the cases, was fairly straightforward. Management should stay out of 
voluntary transfers of shares between and among shareholders. 
Shareholders are competent to look out for themselves. The securities 
markets generally work efficiently, and changes in control generally 
promote economic efficiency. Management’s motives for wanting to block 
a bid are suspect to the extent that they stand to lose their jobs if a change 
in control does take place.  
These policy assumptions reflect liberal, free-market ideas about 
shareholder competence, market efficiency, and the risks of management 
self-dealing. It is consistent with the basic policy assumptions, for 
example, of Delaware corporation law and Delaware jurisprudence 
relating to corporate control contests.
7
 
The Japanese establishment’s interest in Article 247 and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) law more generally began in 2000 when Yoshiaki 
Murakami, a former Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) 
official, launched the first postwar hostile tender offer against Shoei, a 
little-known real estate and electronic parts company.
8
 Alarm within 
corporate Japan accelerated in late 2003, when Steel Partners made hostile 
bids against two other small companies, Yushiro and Sotoh, and gained 
further momentum in 2004 when Murakami initiated a control contest for 
Nippon Broadcasting System (NBS).
9
 The panic peaked in 2005 when 
Takafumi Horie announced he had secretly acquired (mostly from 
Murakami, it turned out) a large block of NBS shares and was launching a 
tender offer.
10
 
 
 
 6. See, e.g., Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] July 25, 1989, 704 HANREI TAIMUZU 
[HANTA] 84. As a recent and well-publicized example, in 2006 Hokuetsu Paper Mills warded off a 
hostile bid by Oji Paper by issuing shares to ―friendly‖ Mitsubishi Corporation and Nippon Paper. 
Yasuyuki Onishi, Oji Paper Encounters Unexpected Difficulties in Hokuetsu Takeover Bid, NIKKEI 
BUS., Aug. 21, 2006, available at http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/eng/20061206/115010/. 
 7. See Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the Coherence of 
Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (2003). 
 8. See ENRICO COLCERA, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL OF JAPAN 110 (2007) for an 
account of Murakami’s campaign against Shoei.  
 9. Id. at 111–12. 
 10. For a journalistic account of Murakami’s and Livedoor’s actions in relation to NBS, see 
YASUAKI ŌSHOKA, HIRUZU MOKUJIROKU: KENSHŌ RAIBUDOA [HILLS APOCALYPSE: LIVEDOOR 
UNDER INVESTIGATION] (Asahi Shimbun-sha, 2006). 
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2. The Kanda Committee’s Blueprint for the Japanese Poison Pill 
Article 247, as it had been interpreted by the courts, posed a problem 
because it did not provide for any exceptions. Under existing precedent, if 
there was an issuance of stock rights and the ―primary purpose‖ was to 
block a hostile bid, it was legally dead. Unless this obstacle could be 
somehow dealt with, the Japanese poison pill was also dead. To address 
the problem, in September 2004, METI announced the formation of an 
informal Corporate Value Study Group
11—headed by Professor Hideki 
Kanda of Tokyo University, manned by prominent foreign-trained 
Japanese corporate lawyers from the large Japanese firms and legal 
academics, and ―advised‖ by Sullivan & Cromwell and Lazard Freres—to 
―study‖ the feasibility of adopting an American-style poison pill within the 
Japanese legal and regulatory framework. It seems clear that the 
committee’s mission was to study not whether, but how, to facilitate the 
poison pill in a Japanese context.
12
  
Awkwardly, the Kanda Committee issued its report in May 2005, just 
two months before the new Company Law was promulgated. The report 
acknowledged that Japanese law surrounding corporate control 
transactions is highly unsettled and that ―rules‖ (presumably legislation) 
needed to be urgently promulgated to ensure that the defensive 
arrangements adopted by Japanese companies are neither overly nor 
insufficiently protective.
13
 The committee implicitly recognized its own 
lack of legal authority to create rules and beckoned the legislature to do so. 
Yet, two months later, the new Company Law was promulgated without 
any mention of poison pills or other defensive arrangements. 
The Kanda Committee surveyed foreign law and precedents, both 
American and European, to serve as possible models and reference points 
for the Japanese poison pill. This type of multijurisdictional survey is the 
time-honored practice of ministry-appointed committees charged with 
proposing new policy or legislation.
14
 The model that the study group 
presented as the best one for Japan to emulate was Delaware’s model, in 
 
 
 11. CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, CORPORATE VALUE REPORT (May 27, 2005), available 
at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economic_oganization/pdf/houkokusyo_hontai_eng.pdf [hereinafter 
CORPORATE VALUE REPORT]. 
 12. The Kanda Committee was convened under the auspices of METI’s Policy Division, headed 
between 2004 and 2006 by Takao Kitabata. Kitabata subsequently attained notoriety as Vice Minister 
from 2006 to 2008 for his colorful theory of ―good‖ and ―bad‖ shareholders and for taking frequent 
potshots at Steel Partners and other foreign ―activist‖ funds.  
 13. Corporate Value Report, supra note 11, at 112. 
 14. Multi-jurisdictional surveys are also a dominant format of Japanese legal scholarship. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/9
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particular the framework of analysis established in the Unocal case.
15
 The 
report characterized Delaware law and the Unocal case at a very high level 
of abstraction. It reported that Delaware permitted defensive measures that 
met the following criteria and recommended that Japanese law follow suit: 
(i) whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a 
threat to corporate value when a defensive measure is triggered; (ii) 
whether a defensive measure to eliminate the threat is excessive; 
and (iii) whether the board has made a prudent and independent 
decision on the reasonableness of a defensive measure.
16
 
At this high level of generality, the criteria become virtually 
meaningless and fail to convey the richness and complexity of the law of 
control transactions in Delaware under Unocal and its many progeny. 
Delaware M&A jurisprudence embodies a theory of dynamic relationships 
between and among management, controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders as well as the courts.
17
 The underlying theory is expressed 
doctrinally in terms of the ―business judgment rule‖—a series of 
boundary-setting conditions that differentiate between management 
actions (including defensive techniques) that the courts will not second 
guess because the shareholders are presumably adequately protected and 
others that call for special scrutiny by the courts.
18
 
At the outset, one of the fundamental conditions required by Unocal 
and other Delaware cases in order to insulate a management decision from 
judicial second guessing is that the decision be approved by a majority of 
independent outside directors. If this condition is met, suspicion that 
management self-dealing is at play abates.
19
 The Kanda Committee report, 
however, conveniently glossed over this requirement, presumably because 
of the fact that the overwhelming majority of Japanese public companies 
do not have meaningful numbers of independent outside directors.
20
 At the 
threshold, one of the basic predicates for importing Unocal into Japan was 
missing.  
 
 
 15. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 16. Corporate Value Report, supra note 11, at 85. 
 17. See supra note 7.  
 18. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 90 (1991).  
 19. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 20. Companies listed on the Tōkyō Stock Exchange have an average of 0.86 ―outside‖ directors. 
TŌKYŌ STOCK EXCHANGE, TSE-LISTED COMPANIES: WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19 
(2009), available at http://www.tse.or.jp/english/rules/cg/white_paper09.pdf. 
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In any event, a written summary, no matter how detailed, could not 
provide a realistic substitute for the nuances and architecture of a 
jurisprudence that developed organically in Delaware over several 
decades. To give abstract criteria distilled from Delaware jurisprudence to 
Japanese courts and to expect the courts to use those criteria to generate 
coherent results is like telling someone golf is about using a stick to put 
the ball in the cup in as few strokes as possible and expecting them to use 
the information actually to play golf.
21
 
3. Livedoor-NBS’s Delaware-Inspired Dicta 
In Spring 2005, just as the Kanda Committee was putting the finishing 
touches on its report, the picture was further complicated by Takafumi 
Horie’s announcement that his company, Livedoor, had covertly acquired 
thirty-five percent of NBS shares and was launching a tender offer to take 
control of NBS.
22
 This captured headlines across Japan and prompted NBS 
and its affiliated large shareholder, Fuji Television, to resort to a crude but 
common defensive tactic in Japan (not to be confused with a poison pill): 
NBS issued a large slug of warrants to Fuji Television that, when 
exercised, would cause Livedoor’s shares to be diluted.23  
 
 
 21. The differences in the way Japanese courts and Delaware courts approach corporate law 
problems is illustrated by two M&A cases decided at roughly the same time. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS 
Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) involved the enforceability of a merger agreement after a 
new bidder arrived before the closing to offer more attractive terms. A closely divided Delaware 
Supreme Court held that management of the target company had a fiduciary duty to their shareholders 
to entertain higher bids even after a merger agreement had been signed and that shareholder interests 
would be best served by allowing the higher bid to win. Id. at 918. The validity of the merger 
agreement was viewed in corporate terms, i.e., the interests of shareholders as intermediated by their 
fiduciary agents, by the board of directors. By contrast, in Sumitomo Trust v. UFJ Holdings, Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 30, 2004, 1708 SHŌJI HŌMU 22, the Japanese courts were called on to 
enforce an agreement in which the parties agreed to negotiate exclusively with each other regarding a 
possible merger. The exclusive negotiating agreement became an issue when, as in Omnicare, a third 
party arrived to offer better terms. The Japanese courts upheld the enforceability of the exclusive 
negotiating contract, which they viewed as a simple contract law issue that had no relation to possible 
shareholder interests. Id. at 24–25; see Hiroyuki Tezuka, M&A keiyaku ni okeru dokusenken fuyō to 
sono genkai [Exclusive Negotiating Rights in M&A Agreements and Their Limits], 1708 SHŌJI HŌMU 
12 (2004) (arguing that the courts in Sumitomo Trust-UFJ Holdings did not give sufficient attention to 
the corporate dimensions of the exclusive negotiation agreement). 
 22. Nippon hoso kabu—Raibudoa ga 35% shutoku [Livedoor Acquires 35% of Livedoor], 
YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Feb. 8, 2005, available at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/mnews/20050208 
mh12.htm.  
 23. Arata na boei shudan? Shinkabu yoyakuken [A New Defensive Technique? Warrants to 
Acquire Newly Issued Shares], YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Feb. 25, 2005, available at http://www.yomiuri.co. 
jp/atmoney/mnews/20050225mh12.htm. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/9
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Livedoor filed a lawsuit in the Tokyo District Court to enjoin the 
warrants under Article 247.
24
 This presented the Tokyo District Court with 
a hot potato. The factual background indicated clearly that the sole 
purpose of the warrants was to block Livedoor. Therefore, the court was 
pushed firmly by precedent to issue an injunction.
25
 On the other hand, it 
was widely known that the Kanda Committee was at work establishing a 
legal framework for the Japanese version of the poison pill—and a poison 
pill, after all, is an issuance of warrants designed to block a bidder’s 
attempt to gain control.
26
 The cross currents can be sensed in the 
Livedoor-NBS opinions—the push of settled precedent against the pull of 
an imminently expected, but still unformed and unpublished, proposal to 
amend the law.  
The Tokyo High Court’s decision was issued in March 2005, two 
months before the official publication of the Kanda Committee report.
27
 
The inference seems strong that the courts, METI, and the Kanda 
Committee were in direct or indirect communication with each other.
28
 
The Tokyo High Court, based on the weight of existing precedents, 
enjoined the warrants. At the same time, however, the court issued 
remarkably detailed dicta, almost certainly based on intelligence supplied 
by METI and the Kanda Committee about Unocal and Delaware law, 
which spelled out the kind of ―abusive‖ bidder it would be legitimate to 
try to obstruct: 
(1) the case where the acquirer accumulates the target shares for the 
purpose of making the concerned parties of the company buy back 
the shares at a higher price by driving up share prices, though there 
exists no true intention of participating in management of the 
company (the case of the so-called ―greenmailer‖);  
(2) the case where the acquirer accumulates the target shares for the 
purpose of an abusive acquisition, such as temporarily taking 
control of management of the company and transferring assets 
 
 
 24. Livedoor v. Nippon Broad. Sys., Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Mar. 11, 2005, 
1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 140.  
 25. Id. at 149.  
 26. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/keiei_ 
innovation/keizaihousei/ma_rule.html (last visited May 7, 2011). 
 27. Livedoor v. Nippon Broad. Sys., Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] Mar. 16, 2005, 
1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 125. 
 28. Needless to say, it would be viewed as inappropriate in most jurisdictions for an 
administrative agency to communicate ex parte with a court concerning a pending case. MODEL CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.B(7) (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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necessary for business operations of the target, such as intellectual 
property, know-how, confidential business information, and 
information as for major clients and customers, to the said acquirer 
or its group companies;  
(3) the case where the acquirer accumulates the target shares in 
order to pledge the target’s assets as collateral for debts of the 
acquirer or its group companies or as funds for repaying such debts, 
after taking control of the company; 
(4) the case where the acquirer accumulates the target shares for the 
purpose of temporarily taking control of management of the 
company so as to dispose of high-value assets such as real estate 
and negotiable securities that are currently not related to the 
company’s businesses and pay temporarily high dividends out of 
proceeds from the disposition, or sell the shares at a higher price 
because share prices have risen rapidly due to temporarily high 
dividends.
29
 
The first category, ―greenmail,‖ had been mentioned in Unocal as a 
―threat‖ against which a board could legitimately try to protect the 
corporation and was also referred to as a legitimate ―threat‖ in the Kanda 
Committee report.
30
 The second category, corporate ―looting‖ or 
―scorched earth‖ tactics, though not specifically mentioned in the Kanda 
Committee’s report, was treated in some Delaware cases as a ―threat‖ 
against which management would be justified to take action.
31
 The third 
and fourth categories—leveraged buyout acquirers and bust-up 
acquirers—have never been characterized as ―threats‖ justifying defensive 
measures in Delaware law and were not mentioned in the Corporate Value 
Report. But the inclusion of this type of perceived short-term, financially 
motivated acquirer (as opposed to long-term, strategically motivated 
acquirer) as ―abusive‖ was quite consistent with ―bad‖ shareholder theory 
being developed within METI’s Policy Division, the Kanda Committee’s 
sponsor. The third and fourth categories, in particular the fourth category, 
seem to be designed to capture bidders like Steel Partners.
32
  
 
 
 29. Livedoor, 1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] at 133. 
 30. Corporate Value Report, supra note 11, at 87. 
 31. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). 
 32. When the Kanda Committee report was published two months later in May 2005, it recycled 
the dicta in Livedoor as legal authority for its proposed list of ―threats‖ that justify defensive measures. 
See Corporate Value Report, supra note 11, at 23. 
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Normally, issuing unnecessary dicta, especially at this level of detail, 
would be considered poor judicial practice.
33
 So would a court’s accepting 
of ex parte coaching on legal issues involved in a pending case from an 
administrative agency. But more than this, what one looks for in vain in 
the Livedoor decisions is a coherent explanation of the policy underlying 
the four categories. The four categories are in part, it is clear, somehow 
derived from Delaware law. But the larger framework and methodology 
used by Delaware courts is completely missing. Delaware M&A 
jurisprudence is not a set of cookie-cutter formulas and answers; it is a 
finely structured way of thinking about a set of issues. Why, as Article 247 
precedents tell us, should management ―in principle‖ not interfere with 
contests among shareholders for corporate control? Why is this pegged as 
an Article 247 issue—that is, one that relates specifically to the issuance of 
warrants—rather than a broader one linked to something like the business 
judgment rule? What are the exceptions to the general rule, and what is 
their justification? Why, for example, do leveraged buyouts pose a threat? 
What is wrong with selective sale of a target company’s assets? On these 
questions, the decision is a total blank. The four categories were simply 
delivered cold, from the hip, without explanation or context.  
The report of an unofficial study group and dicta in one opinion are 
fairly shaky legal ground, but corporate Japan took them as a green light 
for the Japanese poison pill. Lazard Freres and Sullivan & Cromwell, the 
foreign investment bank and law firm that had provided the Kanda 
Committee with intelligence about Delaware law and American M&A 
practice, put their credentials to work and advised Nippon Steel and others 
on the implementation of formidable poison pills.
34
 In the three years 
following the Kanda Committee report, over five hundred Japanese 
companies adopted poison pills patterned on the blueprint provided by the 
study group.
35
 The kittens were now out of the bag. 
 
 
 33. Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924). 
 34. Press Release, Nippon Steel Corp., Nippon Steel Announces the Adoption of Fair Rules for 
the Acquisition of Substantial Shareholdings (Takeover Defense Measure) and the Shelf Registration 
of Stock Acquisition Rights (Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.nsc.co.jp/data/200603301151 
30.pdf. 
 35. Corporate Value Study Group, Takeover Defense Measures in Light of Recent 
Environmental Changes 3 (2008), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/080630Take 
overDefenseMeasures.pdf. 
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4. Bulldog Sauce: The Poison Pill that Wasn’t 
This was essentially the state of Article 247 jurisprudence when Steel 
Partners made an unsolicited bid for Bulldog Sauce, offering the 
company’s shareholders a twenty-five percent premium over the 
prevailing market price. It is not clear whether the courts fully appreciated 
it, but the Bulldog Sauce plan that was adopted to fight off Steel Partners 
was not really a poison pill at all. True, on the surface, both the Bulldog 
Sauce plan and a poison pill involve the issuance of stock rights in a 
manner that discriminates against the bidder. But there the differences 
begin.  
A poison pill is typically adopted before a specific bidder appears on 
the scene and gives management a lethal weapon—the ability to issue 
warrants that will dilute and destroy the economic value of the bidder’s 
stock—if the bidder acquires more than a given threshold percentage 
(typically twenty percent) of the company’s stock.36 The poison pill gives 
management the ability to point a gun and say, ―Cross this line and we will 
shoot. Now let’s have a discussion about your price.‖ A poison pill is not 
meant to block takeovers, it is meant to give management leverage and 
time to negotiate ―fair‖ terms on behalf of shareholders.37 Poison pills are 
almost never actually triggered because it would be suicidal for the bidder 
to cross the line and invite being shot. 
The Bulldog Sauce rights plan, by contrast, was adopted by 
shareholders (83.8% of them) and actually triggered after Steel Partners 
appeared on the scene and launched a tender offer.
38
 Moreover, the 
warrants in question were not a lethal weapon designed to destroy the 
economic value of Steel Partners’ stock if it crossed a line, but in effect 
compelled Steel Partners to cash out and sell three-quarters of stock it 
already owned back to the company at the market price. The point of the 
Bulldog Sauce plan was not to keep Steel Partners at bay and enable 
management to negotiate a better deal, but coercively to buy out and expel 
Steel Partners as a shareholder.
39
 The warrants were just an incidental 
formal detail.  
 
 
 36. Alessandro Presti, Poison Pills: Too Strong or Just Right?, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 
(2011), available at http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/11580. 
 37. Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 491 (2001); Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor 
Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton and Rowe’s Apologia for Delaware: A 
Short Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37 (2002). 
 38. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] June 28, 2007, 1805 SHŌJI HŌMU 43, 46–48. 
 39. Technically, the plan worked as follows: All shareholders would be issued warrants 
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Another dimension that the courts did notice, but the implications of 
which they did not fully comprehend, was that 83.8% of the 
shareholders—essentially all shareholders other than Steel Partners 
itself—had voted in favor of a cash-out that would expel Steel Partners as 
a shareholder and, with it, destroy any chance they might have to induce 
Steel Partners to offer an even higher premium.
40
 What the Bulldog Sauce 
shareholders were saying was that they did not want Steel Partners’ 
money, period—no matter how much they were offered. The shareholders 
did not adopt the ―poison pill‖ because they thought the premium being 
offered was inadequate and wanted to ratchet up the price. They were 
saying that they did not want Steel Partners to buy their shares at any 
price.
41
  
5. The District Court’s Midflight Correction and the High Court’s 
Hijack 
These were the facts which the Tokyo District Court put through the 
mill of Article 247. In light of the dicta in the Livedoor case, the most 
straightforward way of resolving whether the Bulldog Sauce warrants 
were ―materially unfair‖ would have been to find that Steel Partners fit 
under one of the four ―abusive acquirer‖ categories. But the district court, 
perhaps feeling that the evidence did not support such a finding, or in any 
event that such a finding would be controversial, tried to finesse the issue 
by creating yet another gloss on the ―abusive acquirer‖ doctrine. The court 
held, in the form of a new evidentiary rule, that if a majority of 
shareholders vote to take defensive measures against an identified bidder, 
the bidder is presumptively an ―abusive acquirer.‖42 Therefore, the district 
court concluded that it was ―not necessary‖ for it to make its own 
 
 
convertible into three additional Bulldog Sauce shares. However, Steel Partners and its affiliates were 
designated as ―non-qualified persons‖ who could not convert the warrants into additional shares of 
stock but could only convert them into cash at a price equivalent to the market price of Bulldog Sauce 
shares at the time the plan was adopted. Id. at 46. When the smoke cleared, the plan coerced Steel 
Partners into selling three-quarters of its holding in Bulldog Sauce at the prevailing market price.  
 40. Id. at 48. 
 41. The shareholders’ motivations become somewhat easier to understand in light of their make-
up; many were tonkatsu (fried pork cutlet) restaurants that were loyal customers of Bulldog Sauce (a 
Worcestershire-like sauce) who were given or sold small lots of Bulldog Sauce stock to cement the 
supplier-customer relationship. For the majority of Bulldog Sauce shareholders, the stock was not a 
financial investment; it was symbolic of a relationship. The lots that individual shareholders held were 
small enough that a large premium would not have resulted in a significant financial gain in absolute 
terms anyway.  
 42. Id. at 53.  
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independent finding and deferred to the judgment of the Bulldog Sauce 
shareholders, 83.8% of whom had voted for the plan.
43
 
Beyond the awkwardness of having to make yet another unexplained 
midflight correction in Article 247 doctrine—in the form of an evidentiary 
presumption no less—it is puzzling why the fact that approval by an 
overwhelming majority of shareholders led to the conclusion that the plan 
was valid, as opposed to the conclusion that it was simply unnecessary and 
beside the point. If a majority of shareholders had made it clear they did 
not want Steel Partners’ money, Steel Partners’ tender offer posed no 
―threat‖ at all to Bulldog Sauce or its shareholders to begin with. The 
raison d’etre for poison pills is that they protect shareholders.44 If the 
protection was not necessary, the practical solution would have been to let 
Steel Partners simply proceed with its doomed tender offer. An American 
court, one suspects, would have wearily asked Steel Partners why they 
were wasting the court’s time with a practically meaningless lawsuit.  
While the district court made a midflight correction in Article 247, the 
Tokyo High Court proceeded to hijack the airplane altogether. The high 
court took the four discrete ―abusive acquirer‖ categories that began as 
dicta in Livedoor and exploded them into a nativist economic philosophy 
completely at odds with, among other things, the basic premises of 
Delaware corporate law and M&A jurisprudence. Unlike the district court, 
the high court had no qualms about taking it on itself to make the 
evidentiary finding that Steel Partners was an ―abusive acquirer‖; in fact, it 
seemed to relish making the finding: 
 The appellant is a US-based fund organized in the Cayman 
Islands, and organizers of the fund, though the facts surrounding 
them are unclear, have invested over $4 billion in over 30 Japanese 
companies, and at the same time have made moves to gain control 
of the target companies by means of tender offers and other devices, 
with the aim of eventually disposing of their investment at a profit; 
against the appellee, after having acquired a substantial block of 
shares, they moved to acquire control but were rebuffed by 
management . . . having the character of an organization known as 
an investment fund, motivated by incentive fees, a legal entity that 
places profit before everything, has not shown any real interest in 
managing the target company, has no intention of becoming 
involved, and after acquiring shares of the target company, it 
 
 
 43. Id. at 55. 
 44. Supra note 37.  
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launched a sudden tender offer, and using any means available, is 
aiming exclusively to turn a short term profit by selling the 
company off to a third party, ultimately contemplating even selling 
off the company’s assets, so that it can only be said that this is a 
creature whose only focus is profit. Moreover, those connected with 
the appellant, while saying that they intend to acquire the target 
company, instead of acting cooperatively have stirred up mischief 
and discomforted the target company. This being the case, the 
tender offer launched by those connected to the fund, having this 
background and set of motives, damages corporate value and the 
interests of all shareholders, is illegitimate and breaches the 
principle of good faith and sincerity, and it is proper to conclude 
that appellant and those connected to it are abusive acquirers.
45
 
 A corporation is in theory an organization with the goal of 
maximizing corporate value for distribution to shareholders, but at 
the same time a corporation cannot insist on the goal of profit alone. 
It has a social existence, it embraces employees within it, and has 
external relationships with suppliers and customers through which it 
gains profits. Profits must be seen in the context of these other 
relationships with employees, customers, suppliers and the 
surrounding community, i.e. the corporation’s stakeholders. It is not 
possible to view corporate value simply in terms of the 
corporation’s own profits. Steel Partners has no interest in 
participating in Bulldog Sauce’s management and is only interested 
in getting profits from increases in stock price. As such it is an 
abusive acquirer. Its aim is to get a majority of the company’s 
shares, control it, and use control as a means of making a profit for 
itself. It has no perspective on the good management of the 
company and thereby in fact reduces the corporation’s corporate 
value and reduces the economic wellbeing of other shareholders. It 
is wholly reasonable to discriminate against an abusive acquirer 
such as this. When there is a threat of this kind, a company is 
wholly justified in taking defensive measures.
46
 
As one parses the opinion, it is hard to identify exactly what Steel 
Partners did to deserve being labeled an ―abusive acquirer.‖ The operative 
criteria are dished out in a rambling, almost dream-like fashion. At the 
 
 
 45. Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] July 9, 2007, 1806 SHŌJI HŌMU 40, 50. 
 46. Id. at 47. 
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outset of the opinion, the high court states that the question of whether the 
issuance of warrants is ―materially unfair‖ needs to be analyzed 
―holistically,‖ taking into account the ―provenance‖ (―zokusei,‖ literally 
―attributes‖ or ―origins‖) of the bidder and target. 47  The expanded 
definition of ―abusive acquirer‖ goes far beyond the four discrete Livedoor 
categories. Essentially any financially motivated acquirer that does not 
intend to manage and operate the target itself for the long haul is 
―abusive.‖ The intention to sell assets or fire employees post-acquisition 
also appears to be indicia of ―abuse,‖ as is acting in ways to upset or 
discomfort target management.  
The high court’s decision was criticized in Japan because it espoused a 
view of market capitalism that was naïve, anachronistic, and xenophobic.
48
 
What was barely discussed was the judicial hubris the opinion reflects. 
The imported seeds from Delaware sown by the Kanda Committee 
morphed, in the hands of the high court, into an expansive and ill-defined 
new doctrine totally incompatible with liberal market assumptions, much 
broader than necessary to resolve the case before it, and founded on its 
own idiosyncratic and nativist world view. The high court exhibits 
absolutely no reservation or diffidence. This was the schizoid state of the 
Article 247 issue as it landed on the Supreme Court’s doorstep. 
B. Article 109 
1. Degrees of Equality 
Article 109 of the Company Law, which explicitly codified for the first 
time the case law principle that all shareholders be treated equally, was the 
other major obstacle to the Japanese poison pill. As the leading treatise on 
the Company Law acknowledges, the interplay between Article 109 and 
other provisions of the Company Law raises a series of difficult and still 
unresolved questions.
49
 The basic policy behind Article 109 is to prevent 
majority shareholders from using their position to disadvantage, or in 
extreme cases, to dispossess or steal from, minority shareholders.
50
 In an 
 
 
 47. Id. at 46. 
 48. See Panel Discussion by Leading Practitioners, NIKKEI.COM, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www. 
nikkei.co.jp/hensei/comp07/20070905sfa95001_05.html?p=3. 
 49. EGASHIRA, supra note 5, at 125–27. 
 50. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 7, 2007, 1809 SHŌJI HŌMU 16, 18; Keiichi Murata, 
Kaishahō ni okeru kabunushi byodo gensoku (109 jō 1ko) no ishiki to kaishaku [The Concept and 
Interpretation of the Principle of Shareholder Equality in the Company Law (Article 109, Paragraph 
1)], 316 RITSUMEIKAN HOGAKU 400 (2007). 
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extreme case, for example, a sixty percent shareholder could cause the 
board to declare a dividend only to itself and not to the other shareholders. 
As one intuitively recognizes, this would clearly violate the principle of 
equality because some shareholders holding the same shares of stock 
would get a dividend, while others would not.  
There are other provisions of the Company Law, however, that do not 
require strictly equal treatment of shareholders of the same class. For 
example, a company does not have to issue new stock pro rata to existing 
shareholders. It can issue stock to some and not others, and, in the process 
involuntarily dilute some shareholders and increase the share percentages 
held by others.
51
 Similarly, the new Company Law now permits cash-out 
mergers, meaning that if a shareholder controls sixty-seven percent or 
more of a company, it can merge the company into another company it 
controls and pay cash to squeeze out the remaining minority 
shareholders.
52
 This is unequal treatment in the sense that one shareholder 
gets to remain a shareholder, and the other one gets coercively cashed out 
(just like Steel Partners in Bulldog Sauce). There are other possibilities, 
the validity of which have not yet been tested. For example, what about a 
charter provision that declares all stock held by a given shareholder in 
excess of twenty percent as non-voting? Or that a given shareholder had 
two votes for each share? There are some cases that are intuitively clear 
and others that inhabit a complicated gray zone. Where to draw a 
principled line, and on what basis, is a daunting task that the Japanese 
courts have yet to undertake. Drawing a principled and consistent line, 
presumably, would require a fine analysis of the policies and values served 
by the rule. It would require looking at a series of concrete examples and 
sorting them out. The fact that the new Company Law specifically codifies 
the requirement of shareholder equality in black and white would, 
presumably, limit the flexibility of the courts creatively to work around it.  
 
 
 51. Kaisha-hō [Company Law], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 238.  
 52. The relevant sections of the old Commercial Code were amended in the Company Law so as 
to eliminate restrictions on the form of consideration that can be used in a merger. Id. art. 749. 
Formerly, only shares of the surviving corporation were valid consideration. Shō-hō [Commercial 
Code], Law No. 48 of March 9, 1899, art. 352; Keiko Hashimoto et al., Corporations, in JAPANESE 
BUSINESS LAW 118 (Gerald Paul McAlinn ed., 2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1588 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1571 
 
 
 
 
2. The Kanda Committee’s Formalistic Methodology  
The Kanda Committee tackled the Article 109 problem, not with a 
Delaware-style policy-based analysis, but with the highly formalistic 
approach typical in Japanese legal practice and scholarship. As it turns out, 
Professor Kanda himself had written extensively on the subject, and the 
committee’s report, concluding that Article 109 does not pose an 
impediment to the poison pill, reflects his scholarly views.
53
  
First, the report makes a distinction between stock or stock rights and 
external conditions attached to the stock or stock rights.
54
 The idea is that 
it is unacceptable to discriminate in relation to stock or stock rights, but it 
is acceptable to discriminate in relation to conditions attached to the stock, 
because the Company Law refers specifically to stock and stock rights, not 
conditions attached thereto. The artificiality of this distinction becomes 
apparent if one thinks of a corporation owned by a sixty percent 
shareholder and a forty percent shareholder, both of whose shares are 
otherwise identical. The directors declare a dividend payable to all 
shareholders, but conditioned on the shareholder owning more than forty 
percent of the outstanding stock. Under this analysis, the forty percent 
shareholder has nothing to complain about. He has the same stock and 
stock rights as the sixty percent shareholder. He just did not meet the 
conditions required to receive a dividend.  
A second concept was that of exceptions disproving the rule. As we 
have seen, the Company Law contains specific exceptions to the principle 
of shareholder equality. The premise that there are exceptions leads to a 
rather startling conclusion: the exceptions prove that the rule does not 
really mean what it says and can be ignored.
55
 What this sleight of hand 
fails to answer, however, is how the vital core of the principle, which 
serves an intuitively compelling set of values, can survive exceptions, if 
exceptions prove that the entire rule is a dead letter.  
Finally, the report argues that it would simply be unreasonable to 
interpret the principle of shareholder equality in a way that impeded the 
obvious benefit to ―corporate value‖ offered by well-designed defensive 
arrangements of the kind recommended by the Kanda Committee.
56
 This 
seems to be nothing more than wishful thinking that the impediment 
would go away. The idea that judges, or unofficial study groups, can wave 
 
 
 53. HIDEKI KANDA, KAISHA HO [COMPANY LAW] 65–66 (Kobundo, 9th ed. 2007). 
 54. Corporate Value Report, supra note 11, at 79, 85–86. 
 55. Id. at 85. 
 56. Id. at 85–86. 
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a magic wand and make legal impediments disappear when they get in the 
way of good results is not easy to reconcile with the rule of law.  
3. The Courts Cherry Pick Professor Kanda’s Arguments 
The district court, clearly having researched Professor Kanda’s 
scholarship, rejected the first and third arguments, and adopted the second. 
The district court rejected the first as simply too formalistic. Looking at 
the substance of the transaction, the courts correctly saw that giving 
shareholders free warrants was equivalent to a stock split. So, giving 
warrants to all shareholders except one would be the same as splitting the 
shares of all shareholders except one, which would clearly violate Article 
109 and the principle of shareholder equality.
57
 Having declined to dodge 
Article 109 on overly formalistic grounds, however, the district court went 
on to accept Professor Kanda’s second argument, namely that the 
exceptions wipe out the underlying rule.
58
  
The fact that new shares do not have to be issued pro rata to existing 
shareholders, the court reasoned, demonstrates the larger principle that 
―the Company Law treats the claim of existing shareholders to maintain 
their share percentages as subordinate to their right to equal treatment with 
respect to the economic value of their shares.‖59 Going further, the fact 
that minority shareholders can be squeezed out in a cash-out merger shows 
that: 
a minority shareholder can be removed so long as such shareholder 
receives cash or other consideration equivalent to the value of its 
shares and its economic interests are thus preserved, and subject to a 
special vote (i.e., vote of two-thirds majority) at a shareholders 
meeting. 
When one considers the substance of these types of provisions of 
the Company Law (i.e., the merger squeeze-out rules), the 
discriminatory exercise provisions attached to the free warrants 
distributed to the Bulldog Sauce shareholders, even if they result in 
a specified shareholder (i.e., Steel Partners) suffering the 
disadvantage of having its share percentage reduced, at least if the 
warrants were authorized by a special vote at a shareholders 
meeting and adequate consideration was paid for the shares, [the 
 
 
 57. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] June 28, 2007, 1805 SHŌJI HŌMU 43, 49. 
 58. Id. at 50–51. 
 59. Id. at 50. 
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discriminatory provisions] do preserve the shareholder’s right to 
economic equality, and in these circumstances cannot be interpreted 
as violating the principle of shareholder equality . . . .
60
 
In short, from the premises that (a) the Company Law does not give 
shareholders mandatory anti-dilution rights and (b) in merger situations 
squeeze-outs of dissenting shareholders are permitted subject to a 
supermajority shareholder vote and appraisal rights, the district court leapt 
to the quite stunning general conclusion that (c) a shareholder can be 
forcibly cashed out as a shareholder basically for any reason and at any 
time, subject only to the vote of a two-thirds’ majority and payment of 
―adequate consideration.‖ As a rule of substantive corporate law and basic 
property law, this is quite radical. Taken literally, the district court’s 
decision implies that, located somewhere in the penumbra of the Company 
Law, there is, in effect, a generalized expropriation or eminent domain 
right against minority shareholders. Not only is the substantive result 
remarkable, but the path of reasoning that the court used to arrive at the 
destination is an all-purpose scythe that allows courts to mow down any 
general rule that comes bundled with exceptions.  
The Tokyo High Court, perhaps even more comfortable than the 
district court in acting as a roving court of equity, simply demoted Article 
109 to the status of a fuzzy ―principle‖ that does not need to be strictly 
observed: 
The principle of shareholder equality codified in the Company Law 
is in the end just a principle, as evidenced by the fact that the 
Company Law contains provisions that are exceptions to the 
principle. The principle of shareholder equality is based on the legal 
ideal of equity, and Article 109 is nothing more than an expression 
of generalized ideals of equity. Therefore it is not proper to interpret 
the principle of shareholder equality as requiring formal equality in 
proportion to the content and number of shares, except where the 
Company Law otherwise specifically requires such equality. Even if 
there is discriminatory treatment of shareholders, if such 
discrimination is rational taking into account relevant provisions of 
the Company Law, then it does not violate the principle of 
shareholder equality.
61
 
 
 
 60. Id. at 51. 
 61. Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.] July 9, 2007, 1806 SHŌJI HŌMU 40, 46. 
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The high court seems to be following the third line of reasoning we 
saw in the Kanda Committee report, to the effect that Article 109 cannot 
mean what it says to the extent that it stands in the way of equity, 
rationality, corporate value, and blocking abusive acquirers. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Solomonic Solution 
Perhaps hesitating to air a family squabble in public, the Supreme 
Court’s opinion never openly acknowledged the rift between the district 
court and high court opinions. There was no discussion of the lower court 
opinions, no explanation of how they differ, nor any correction of judicial 
error below. The Supreme Court simply rewrote its own opinion from 
scratch and left it to the reader to figure out where the lower courts went 
wrong.  
The Supreme Court decision is much shorter and addresses the issues 
at a much higher level of abstraction than the lower courts’ decisions. 
Most striking, whereas the two lower courts treated Articles 247 and 109 
as separate and doctrinally distinct issues, the Supreme Court strategically 
blurs the two and applies essentially the same set of doctrinal conditions 
and definitions to both. The result the Supreme Court deftly achieved by 
blending Articles 247 and 109 into more or less a single doctrinal issue 
was both to avoid approving, if not explicitly overruling, the high court’s 
provocative abusive acquirer doctrine on the Article 247 front, and at the 
same time to sharply limit the lower courts’ summary demotion of the 
principle of shareholder equality. The key passage from the Supreme 
Court’s opinion states: 
The principle of shareholder equality, in order to preserve the 
interests of each shareholder, requires that the stock owned by 
shareholders be treated equally as to substance and numbers. 
However, since it is impossible to imagine that the interests of each 
shareholder could be preserved if the corporation were to cease to 
exist or grow, when there is an identified shareholder which seeks 
to acquire control of the corporation, and there is reason to believe 
that acquisition of control by such shareholder would endanger the 
corporation’s existence or growth, or the corporation’s corporate 
value would otherwise be threatened, and as a result the interests of 
the corporation and the common interests of the shareholders are 
threatened with harm, even if defensive measures of a 
discriminatory nature are taken against the shareholder seeking to 
take control, so long as such measures do not violate principles of 
equity and are not lacking in proportionality, it cannot be said that 
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this directly offends the substance of the principle. Now, on the 
question of whether acquisition of control by a given shareholder 
would harm the interests of the corporation or the common interests 
of the shareholders, the ultimate judgment must be made by the 
shareholders themselves whose interests are bound up with those of 
the corporation, and absent the lack of proper procedures taken at 
the shareholders meeting [at which the defensive measures are 
adopted], or the factual premises of the decision prove to be false, 
or fraud and the like, or the existence of a serious defect in the 
legitimacy of the decision, the decision of the shareholders must be 
respected.
62
 
This passage is about Article 109. But, notice carefully, the doctrinal 
concepts the Supreme Court applies—corporate value, threat, 
proportionality, evidentiary presumption in favor of a shareholder vote—
are the concepts that the Kanda Committee and the lower courts applied 
not to Article 109, but to Article 247. This seems odd, since Articles 247 
and Article 109 reflect underlying policies that are different, or at least 
opposite sides of the same coin. As in the lower court decisions, there is 
no discussion of a larger policy context. The mention of ―threat‖ and 
―proportionality‖ is a silent bow to Unocal, the Kanda Committee, and 
Livedoor. However, the words are ripped out of their original context and 
defined out of existence, in any event, by the concept that ―threat‖ and 
―proportionality‖ mean whatever a majority of shareholders decides. What 
the Supreme Court did accomplish by conflating Articles 247 and 109 in 
this way was narrowly to limit the lower courts’ overly broad Article 109 
rulings. Recall that, on Article 109, the district court ruled that there was a 
general expropriation right lurking in the penumbra of the Company Law, 
while the high court demoted the principle of shareholder equality to a 
fuzzy rule that could be observed in the breach. The Supreme Court, by 
contrast, limits its holding on Article 109 to situations where there is ―an 
identified shareholder which seeks to acquire control of the corporation‖ 
and a large number of shareholders vote to take discriminatory action 
against the identified shareholder—i.e., the specific facts of the Bulldog 
Sauce case itself. Perhaps the Supreme Court, lacking a commercial 
background, did not itself realize how radically this narrowed the ruling. 
Even in Japan, getting a majority of shareholders to vote to tell an 
identified bidder to ―get lost,‖ regardless of the premium offered, is likely 
to be a rare event. The peculiar shareholder base of Bulldog Sauce 
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accounts for what was, in effect, an aberrant, economically irrational 
shareholder decision. In these rare circumstances, if the shareholders vote 
to block a tender offer, it has no practical significance since the tender 
offer, if it went forward, would fail anyway.
63
  
Most significantly and ironically of all, because of the way the 
Supreme Court narrowed the Article 109 ruling to fit the unique facts of 
Bulldog Sauce, the decision has nothing at all to say about conventional 
poison pills, which are adopted before an identified bidder appears on the 
horizon. After all the twists and turns beginning with the Kanda 
Committee report, the opinion does nothing to clarify the legal status of 
the poison pills now in place across corporate Japan. The legality of the 
Japanese poison pill still rests on the Kanda Committee report and a vague 
consensus based on comfort in the numbers of corporations that have gone 
ahead and adopted poison pills. The Supreme Court deftly killed a second 
bird by imposing the same narrow conditions on both Article 109 and 
Article 247: to the extent that the shareholders, rather than the courts, 
determine whether a ―threat‖ exists, the courts are absolved from having to 
determine whether particular bidders are ―abusive‖ or not, and the high 
court’s flamboyant ―abusive acquirer‖ doctrine is thereby neutralized. 
Significantly, though, the Supreme Court never specifically overruled the 
high court’s ―abusive acquirer‖ doctrine or finding. Like the district court, 
it simply said the court had not needed to make such a determination if the 
shareholders had voted. The death of the high court’s nativist ―abusive 
acquirer‖ doctrine therefore cannot be conclusively proved; it continues to 
float over the opinion like Banquo’s ghost.  
The Supreme Court’s Bulldog Sauce opinion was a calculated exercise 
in damage control, not a bold statement of policy. It reined in the excesses 
of the two lower courts, but whatever substantive corporate law doctrine 
was left standing verged on meaninglessness. To conclude, as some have, 
that the Kanda Committee’s report and the cases that it inspired show 
Japanese corporate law ―converging‖ with that of Delaware is confusing 
superficial resemblance with real substance.
64
 
 
 
 63. Japanese academics and commentators largely took the view that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bulldog Sauce reflected ―respect for shareholders‖ without reflecting on the question of 
why shareholders need to be protected from a tender offer they have shown they will reject anyway. 
See, e.g., Masafumi Nakahigashi, Burudokku sōsu jiken to kabunushi sōkai no handan no sonchō [The 
Bulldog Sauce Case and Respect for Decisions made at Shareholders Meetings], 1346 JURISUTO 17 
(2007). 
 64. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware?: The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005). 
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The entire episode exposes a judiciary whose comprehension of its own 
role and scope of authority is undisciplined, shifting, and unformed. 
Deciding more than necessary to resolve the case before it—as in 
gratuitous dicta injected in Livedoor, or the Tokyo High Court’s out-of-
the-blue reinvention of the ―abusive acquirer‖ doctrine—seems to cause 
no bashfulness. Amending the applicable doctrine from case to case, or 
shifting the basis for decision without comment or explanation at different 
levels in the appellate process, are accepted as unremarkable. As the 
district court and high court’s Article 109 decisions reveal, judges show 
little reserve ignoring or marginalizing statutes that get in the way of 
results that they believe need to be delivered.  
This judicial style, which embodies broadly held Japanese mentalities 
shared across a range of other intellectual disciplines, ultimately reflects 
institutional weakness rather than strength. Manipulating doctrine low to 
the ground to accommodate the dominant consensus reveals not an 
imperial judiciary, but one that is eager to please. For the most part, 
judicial accommodation of the dominant consensus leaves no victims. But 
there are exceptions, which I take up in the conclusion of this essay. 
D. Putting the “Abusive Acquirers” Out of Business: The Murakami 
Insider Trading Case 
Although the Supreme Court sterilized the high court’s ―abusive 
acquirer‖ doctrine, the notion that the new breed of raider was a greedy 
and rapacious threat to traditional Japanese business norms and ethics 
continued to run strong through the establishment. In 2006, the national 
prosecutor’s office indicted Horie and Murakami on criminal charges and 
put them out of business.
65
 This time, failure by the courts to see the 
relationship between the literal words of a criminal statute and the policies 
served by the statute led to a shameful miscarriage of justice. 
Yoshiaki Murakami was arrested in June 2006 for insider trading 
violations related to his fund’s trading of shares of NBS, the same 
company whose attempt to thwart Livedoor’s bid by issuing warrants to its 
affiliate Fuji Television a year earlier had been invalidated in the Livedoor 
decision.
66
 Murakami was convicted by the Tokyo District Court in July 
 
 
 65. 4000 oku fando hōkai kiken Murakami daihyō taiho [¥400 Billion Fund on Verge of 
Collapse; Principal Murakami Arrested], YOMIURI SHIMBUN, June 6, 2006, available at http://www. 
yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/mnews/20060606mh06.htm; Raibudoa Horie shachō taiho [Livedoor President 
Horie Arrested], YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/ 
mnews/20060124mh17.htm. 
 66. Livedoor v. Nippon Broad. Sys., Tōkyō Chihō Saibanscho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Mar. 11, 2005, 
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2007 (the same month the Supreme Court took on the Bulldog Sauce case) 
and sentenced to two years of hard labor, while his fund was fined a record 
¥1.149 billion.
67
 The Tokyo High Court’s decision to convict Murakami of 
insider trading dramatizes the pitfalls of applying rules mechanically 
without connecting the meaning of the rules to a larger factual and policy 
context. The Tokyo District Court framed the issues of the case at the 
outset: 
The facts underlying the indictment are as stated in the court’s 
findings of fact, but among other facts, we note the defendant 
corporation’s [Murakami Fund’s] business, that the individual 
defendant [Murakami] is a director and effective manager of 
[Murakami Fund], that between November 9, 2004, and January 26, 
2005, through [Lehman Brothers] and other intermediaries, 
purchased 1,933,100 shares of [NBS] stock, and on November 8, 
2004, [Murakami] admits he unmistakably heard from [Horie] that 
he [Horie] was interested in acquiring control of [NBS], but thought 
that it was just big talk and an exaggeration, that [Murakami] had 
been acquiring stock of [NBS] well before in anticipation of a proxy 
fight, and did not acquire additional shares of NBS based on gaining 
information that [Livedoor] intended to acquire NBS shares on a 
large scale, and that he [Murakami] is therefore innocent.
68
 
At the outset, the statute that Murakami was accused of criminally 
violating, Article 167 of the Securities Law, is nowhere identified, nor are 
the facts relevant to his guilt under the statute.
69
 The questions, ―How did 
he violate the statute?‖ and ―Who was actually hurt?‖ are never addressed. 
Indeed, Article 167 is mentioned for the first time more than halfway 
through the forty-page opinion, and then only partially and in passing.
70
 
The court, having ―framed‖ the issues, then proceeds to recount various 
facts, beginning with the formation of the Murakami Fund and continuing 
through Murakami Fund’s acquisition of NBS shares starting in 2003, 
Murakami’s heavily publicized campaign against NBS management, 
 
 
1173 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 40. 
 67. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] July 19, 2007 (Murakami Insider Trading) 
(unpublished), available at http://www.westlawjapan.com/case_law/pdf/WLJP_10-01-2008_04_22. 
pdf. 
 68. Id. at 2–3. 
 69. KINYŪ SHŌHIN TORIHIKI-HŌ [FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND EXCHANGE ACT], Law No. 25 
of 1948, as amended by Law No. 109 of 2006, art. 167.  
 70. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] July 19, 2007 (Murakami Insider Trading) 
(unpublished), available at http://www.westlawjapan.com/case_law/pdf/WLJP_10-01-2008_04_22. 
pdf. 
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followed with accounts of meetings with Horie in late 2004 in which 
Murakami encouraged Horie to make his own bid for NBS.
71
 Without any 
indication from the court as to what exactly Murakami’s crime consisted 
of, an ordinary reader is at a loss to decipher which of the many facts bear 
upon Murakami’s guilt. The decision lacks an anchoring thesis. 
To fill in the context missing in the decision itself, Article 167 of the 
Japanese Securities Exchange Law somewhat cryptically expresses a rule 
analogous to Rule 14e-3 under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act that, in 
essence, prohibits trading in a company’s shares if the trading party knows 
that an unannounced tender offer will be launched for the company’s 
shares.
72
 The basic policy objectives of both rules is clear: to prevent 
parties who discover the existence of a planned tender offer before it is 
announced from getting an unfair ―jump on the market‖ and locking in an 
undeserved tender offer premium ahead of the announcement.
73
  
Murakami ran afoul of Article 167 because, on November 8, 2004, he 
visited Horie and encouraged him to launch his own tender offer for 
NBS.
74
 Horie indicated he was definitely interested, but still unsure 
whether he could arrange the necessary financing.
75
 Horie begged 
Murakami to hold on to, and not sell out, the eighteen percent of NBS that 
Murakami had already amassed; Horie was counting on Murakami’s 
eighteen percent, to add to the thirty-three percent plus that Horie hoped to 
acquire himself, to add up to majority control of NBS. Murakami replied, 
―I can’t promise anything, but trust me.‖76 Based on this conversation, the 
prosecution alleged that Murakami ―knew‖ that Horie/Livedoor were 
committed to launching a tender offer for NBS.
77
 Therefore, any trading 
that Murakami did in NBS shares between the date of the conversation, 
November 8, 2004, and the date that Horie announced his position in NBS 
on February 8, 2004, was tainted and in violation of Article 167.
78
  
The prosecution and Murakami’s lawyers, and subsequently the court, 
narrowed the relevant legal issue to whether Murakami had sufficient 
―knowledge‖ of Horie’s intention to launch a tender offer based on what 
 
 
 71. Id. at 3.  
 72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a).  
 73. Tender Offers, 45 Fed. Reg. 60411 (Sept. 12, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) 
(Securities and Exchange Commission announcement promulgating Rule 14e-3).  
 74. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] July 19, 2007 (Murakami Insider Trading) 
(unpublished), available at http://www.westlawjapan.com/case_law/pdf/WLJP_10-01-2008_04_22. 
pdf. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 27–28. 
 78. Id. at 36. 
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was communicated at the November 8th meeting.
79
 Murakami argued that 
Horie’s statement that he was ―definitely interested‖ was not an 
unequivocal commitment and that Horie’s ability to line up financing was 
very much in doubt.
80
 The court, having accepted this narrow definition of 
the issues, proceeded to find that Murakami did in fact have the requisite 
knowledge and convicted him.
81
  
What escaped the court, and to some extent Murakami’s own lawyers, 
was the factual and practical commercial context as it related to the 
meaning and purpose of Article 167. Murakami was by no means a typical 
inside trader, lurking in the shadows and abusing nonpublic information 
about a company that no one suspected was in play. To the contrary, it was 
Murakami himself who had invited a control contest for NBS in 2003, 
publicly announcing and disclosing his growing position in the company, 
making loud statements that he thought the stock was undervalued, and 
urging NBS’s affiliate and largest shareholder, Fuji Television, to make its 
own tender offer and convert NBS into a subsidiary.
82
 As a result of 
Murakami’s public campaign, NBS’s stock price rose from ¥2730 in 
January 2003 to ¥4880 in November 2004.
83
 In other words, Murakami 
himself, by completely legitimate methods, had already exposed NBS’s 
hidden value to the benefit of its shareholders. Thanks to Murakami, it was 
public knowledge that NBS was in play and that Fuji Television or a third 
party could make a tender offer at any moment. Indeed, it was Fuji 
Television’s tender offer bid of ¥5950 on January 17, 2005, not any action 
on the part of Horie, that caused the next spike in NBS’s stock price.84 It 
would be hard for an investor to claim that, if he had known that Horie 
would launch a tender offer, he would have bought more NBS stock. In a 
general sense, the information was already well known. 
The other critical fact overlooked by the court was that before Horie 
announced that he had acquired thirty-five percent of NBS on February 8, 
2005—and therefore before any impact on stock price attributable to 
Horie—Murakami had already sold his position to Horie himself. In a 
classic double cross, Murakami covertly sold Horie, in the anonymous 
 
 
 79. Id. at 22.  
 80. Id. at 23. 
 81. Id. at 36. 
 82. Murakami Fando, nippon hōsō no dai-ni kabunushi ni—kaimashi de 7.37% hoyū [Murakami 
Fund Becomes Second Largest NBS Shareholder—Holds 7.37% as a Result of Increased Share 
Percentage], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, July 17, 2003, at 17. 
 83. Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Livedoor, Harvard Business School Case Study No. 9-
206-138, at exhibit 3 (2006).  
 84. Id.  
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after-hours market, the very shares that Horie had begged Murakami to 
hold on to. Horie gleefully announced he had acquired thirty-five percent 
of NBS on February 8, 2005, still thinking that in combining his shares 
and Murakami’s eighteen percent, he had acquired control of NBS. Horie 
received a jolt at the end of February when Murakami’s filings with the 
FSA showed that Murakami had made a grand exit from NBS and that 
Horie was the dupe.
85
 If there was any victim of Murakami’s ―insider 
trading,‖ it was Horie. 
Murakami arguably violated the literal words of Article 167. However, 
he did not offensively violate its spirit. He would have made the same 
trades whether or not he had ―known‖ that Horie would make his own bid. 
Nonetheless, echoing the Tokyo High Court’s ―abusive acquirer‖ doctrine, 
the Tokyo District Court, without a good grasp of the commercial context, 
justified a two-year prison sentence based solely on the fact that 
Murakami’s transactions were motivated by profit: 
It is clear that Murakami’s only motive from the beginning was to 
wring as much profit from the situation as possible, and that was his 
only motive in using insider information. This is a critical factor in 
determining the defendant’s sentence. One may casually think that 
his actions are less serious and malicious than a case of a true 
―insider,‖ but Murakami used his position as chairman of a major 
investment fund to launch a proxy fight demanding ―reforms‖ he 
had no genuine interest in seeing, other than to the extent they might 
result in greater profit for him. He must be punished for his extreme 
greed.
86
 
Just as the Supreme Court put a brake on the excesses of the lower 
courts in Bulldog Sauce, a year-and-a-half later, the Tokyo High Court 
itself corrected the district court’s effort to criminalize Murakami’s 
―greed.‖87 By then, it had become clear that the new breed of raider was a 
limited phenomenon and posed no real threat to the corporate 
establishment. Collective second thoughts about the impulsiveness and 
harshness of the treatment meted out to Murakami and Horie had begun to 
 
 
 85. Murakami Fando—nippon hōsō kabu, 3 gatsu 6% hoyū, jōjō haishi kenen tsuyomaru 
[Murakami Fund—Down to 6% of NBS at End of March—Fears of Delisting Increase], NIHON KEIZAI 
SHIMBUN, Apr. 16, 2005, at 11.  
 86. Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] July 19, 2007 (Murakami Insider Trading) 
(unpublished), available at http://www.westlawjapan.com/case_law/pdf/WLJP_10-01-2008_04_22. 
pdf. 
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surface. The Tokyo High Court’s effective reversal of the criminal 
sentence handed down by the district court, which received scant 
publicity, reflects a different collective mood from the received wisdom 
that prevailed two years earlier: 
If we impose criminal penalties that are overly severe on the kinds 
of market activities described above [i.e., Murakami’s transactions 
in NBS stock], facts which are not even the subject of the 
indictment may become crimes. . . . The Murakami Fund, viewed in 
another light, can be seen as attempting to reform the practices of 
companies it invests in (so called shareholder activism), and we do 
not believe that a mature discussion has yet been completed on that 
subject. The defendant did not from the beginning intend to use 
insider information for personal gain, nor was he strongly conscious 
that he in fact possessed insider information; we do not believe that 
he acted in the conscious belief that he was violating law; or that the 
great majority of the shares he acquired which were subject to the 
indictment were acquired with this consciousness; these facts must, 
in the end, be taken into consideration in determining his criminal 
state of mind.
88
 
One of the basic functions of a judiciary ought to be to distinguish 
between the letter and spirit of rules in a mature and independent way. To 
do so necessarily requires understanding the meaning of rules against a 
real-world context of facts and the policies, principles, and values served 
by the rules in question. The reaction of the Japanese courts to Steel 
Partners, Murakami, and Horie displays an uncritical willingness to serve 
a received consensus by applying and manipulating the surface and letter 
of rules, without inquiring more deeply into the meaning and purpose of 
the rules. Although it is foolhardy to expect that Japanese judicial opinions 
will ever read as if they were penned by Justice Scalia or Judge Posner, 
Japan should welcome a more skeptical, autonomous, and rigorous 
judiciary to serve as a check against the shifting tides of consensus. 
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